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Abstract— Future power networks will be characterized by
safe and reliable functionality against physical malfunctions and
cyber attacks. This paper proposes a unified framework and
advanced monitoring procedures to detect and identify network
components malfunction or measurements corruption caused
by an omniscient adversary. We model a power system under
cyber-physical attack as a linear time-invariant descriptor
system with unknown inputs. Our attack model generalizes
the prototypical stealth, (dynamic) false-data injection and
replay attacks. We characterize the fundamental limitations
of both static and dynamic procedures for attack detection
and identification. Additionally, we design provably-correct
(dynamic) detection and identification procedures based on
tools from geometric control theory. Finally, we illustrate the
effectiveness of our method through a comparison with existing
(static) detection algorithms, and through a numerical study.
I. INTRODUCTION
Problem setup Recent studies and real-world incidents
have demonstrated the inability of the power grid to ensure
a reliable service in the presence of network failures and
possibly malignant actions [1], [2]. Besides failures and
attacks on the physical power grid infrastructure, the envi-
sioned future smart grid is also prone to cyber attacks on its
communication layer. In short, cyber-physical security is a
fundamental obstacles challenging the smart grid vision.
A classical mathematical model to describe the grid on
the transmission level is the so-called structure-preserving
power network model, which consists of the dynamic swing
equation for the generator rotor dynamics, and of the al-
gebraic load-flow equation for the power flows through the
network buses [3]. In this work, we consider the linearized
small signal version of the structure-preserving model, which
is composed by the linearized swing equation and the DC
power flow equation. The resulting linear continuous-time
descriptor model of a power network has also been studied
for estimation and security purposes in [4], [5], [6].
From static to dynamic detection Existing approaches to
security and stability assessment are mainly based upon static
estimation techniques for the set of voltage angles and mag-
nitudes at all system buses, e.g., see [8]. Limitations of these
techniques have been often underlined, especially when the
network malfunction is intentionally caused by an omniscient
attacker [7], [9]. The development of security procedures
that exploit the dynamics of the power network is recog-
nized [10] as an outstanding important problem. We remark
that the use of static state estimation and detection algorithms
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Fig. 1. For the here represented IEEE 14 bus system, if the voltage angle of
one bus is measured exactly, then a cyber attack against the measurements
data is always detectable by our dynamic detection procedure. In contrary,
as shown in [7], a cyber attack may remain undetected by a static procedure
if it compromises as few as four measurements.
has been adopted for many years for several practical and
technological reasons. First, because of the low bandwidth
of communication channels from the measuring units to the
network control centers, continuous measurements were not
available at the control centers, so that the transient behavior
of the network could not be captured. Second, a sufficiently
accurate dynamic model of the network was difficult to
obtain or tune, making the analysis of the dynamics even
harder. As of today, because of recent advances in hardware
technologies, e.g., the advent of Phasor Measurement Units
and of large bandwidth communications, and in identification
techniques for power system parameters [11], these two
limitations can be overcome. Finally, a dynamic estimation
and detection problem was considered much harder than
the static counterpart. We address this theoretic limitation
by improving upon results presented in [12], [13] for the
security assessment of discrete time dynamical networks.
Literature review on dynamic detection Dynamic secu-
rity has been approached via heuristics and expert systems,
e.g., see [14]. Shortcomings of these methods include relia-
bility and accuracy against unforeseen system anomalies, and
the absence of analytical performance guarantees. A different
approach relies on matching a discrete-time state transition
map to a series of past measurements via Kalman filtering,
e.g., see [15], [16] and the references therein. Typically, these
transition maps are based on heuristic models fitted to a
specific operating point [15]. Clearly, such a pseudo-model
poorly describes the complex power network dynamics and
suffers from shortcomings similar to those of expert systems
methods. In [16], the state transition map is chosen more
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accurately as the linearized and Euler-discretized power
network dynamics. The local observability of the resulting
linear discrete-time system is investigated in [16], but in
the absence of unforeseen attacks. Finally, in [17] a graph-
theoretic framework is proposed to evaluate the impact of
cyber attacks on a smart grid and empirical results are given.
Recent approaches to dynamic security consider
continuous-time power system models and apply dynamic
techniques [4], [5], [6], [18]. While [18] adopts an
overly simplified model neglecting the algebraic load flow
equations, the references [4], [5], [6] use a more accurate
network descriptor model. In [5] different failure modes are
modeled as instances of a switched system and identified
using techniques from hybrid control. This approach, though
elegant, results in a severe combinatorial complexity in the
modeling of all possible attacks. In our earlier work [6],
under the assumption of generic network parameters, we
state necessary and sufficient conditions for identifiability
of attacks based on the network topology. Finally, in [4]
dynamical filters are designed to isolate certain predefined
failures of the network components. With respect to this
last work, we assume no a priori knowledge of the set
of compromised components and of their compromised
behavior. Our results generalize and include those of [4].
Contributions This paper’s contributions are fourfold.
First, we provide a unified modeling framework for dynamic
power networks subject to cyber-physical attacks. For our
model, we define the notions of detectability and identifi-
ability of an attack by its effect on output measurements.
Informed by the classic work on geometric control the-
ory [19], [20], our framework includes the deterministic
static detection problem considered in [7], [9], and the
prototypical stealth [21], (dynamic) false-data injection [22],
and replay attacks [23] as special cases. Second, we focus
on the descriptor model of a power system and we show the
fundamental limitations of static and dynamic detection and
identification procedures. Specifically, we show that static
detection procedures are unable to detect any attack affecting
the dynamics, and that attacks corrupting the measurements
can be easily designed to be undetectable. On the contrary,
we show that undetectability in a dynamic setting is much
harder to achieve for an attacker. Specifically, a cyber-
physical attack is undetectable if and only if the attackers’
input signal excites uniquely the zero dynamics of the
input/output system. (As a complementary result, our work
[6] gives necessary and sufficient graph-theoretic conditions
for the absence of zero dynamics, and hence for the absence
of undetectable attacks.) Third, we propose a detection
and identification procedure based on geometrically-designed
residual filters. Under the assumption of attack identifiability,
our method correctly identifies the attacker set independently
of its strategy. From a system-theoretic perspective, correct
identification is implied by the absence of zero dynamics in
our proposed identification filters. Our design methodology
is applicable to linear systems with direct input to output
feedthrough, and it generalizes the construction presented in
[24]. Fourth and finally, we illustrate the potential impact of
our theoretical results on the standard IEEE 14 bus system
(cf. Fig. 1). For this system it is known [7] that an attack
against the measurement data may remain undetected by a
static procedure if the attacker set compromises as few as
four measurements. We show here instead that such an attack
is always detectable by our dynamic detection procedure
provided that at least one bus voltage angle or one generator
rotor angle is measured exactly.
We conclude with two remarks on our contributions. First,
our results (the notions of detectability and identifiability, the
fundamental limitations of static versus dynamic monitoring,
and the geometric design of detection and identification fil-
ters) are analogously and immediately applicable to arbitrary
index-one descriptor systems, thereby including any linear
system x˙ = Ax+ Bu, y = Cx+Du, with attack signal u.
Second, although we treat here the noiseless case, it is well
known [25] that our deterministic detection filters are the
key ingredient, together with Kalman filtering and hypothesis
testing, in the design of statistical identification methods.
Organization Section II presents the descriptor system
model of a power network, our framework for the modeling
of cyber-physical attacks, and the detection and identification
problem. Section III states the fundamental limitations of
static and dynamic detection procedures. Section IV presents
the residual filters for dynamic detection and identification.
Section V contains the IEEE 14 bus system case study.
II. CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS ON POWER NETWORKS
A. Structure-preserving power network model with cyber
and physical attacks
We consider the linear small-signal version of the clas-
sical structure-preserving power network model [3]. This
descriptor model consists of the dynamic linearized swing
equation and the algebraic DC power flow equation. A
detailed derivation from the nonlinear structure-preserving
power network model can be found, for instance, in [4], [6].
Consider a connected power network consisting of n gen-
erators {g1, . . . , gn}, their associated n generator terminal
buses {b1, . . . , bn}, and m load buses {bn+1, . . . , bn+m}.
The interconnection structure of the power network is en-
coded by a connected admittance-weighted graph. The gen-
erators gi and buses bi form the vertex set of this graph,
and the edges are given by the transmission lines {bi, bj}
weighted by the susceptance between buses bi and bj , as well
as the internal connections {gi, bi} weighted by the transient
reactance between each generator gi and its terminal bus bi.
The Laplacian matrix associated to the admittance-weighted
graph is the symmetric matrix
[ Lgg Lgl
Llg Lll
]
∈ R(2n+m)×(2n+m),
where the first n entries are associated with the generators
and the last n + m entries correspond to the buses. The
differential-algebraic model of the power network is given
by the linear continuous-time descriptor system
Ex˙(t) = Ax(t) + P (t), (1)
where the state x = [δT ωT θT]T ∈ R2n+m consists of the
generator rotor angles δ ∈ Rn, the frequencies ω ∈ Rn,
and the bus voltage angles θ ∈ Rm. The input term P (t)
is due to known changes in mechanical input power to the
generators or real power demand at the loads. Furthermore,
the descriptor system matrices are
E =
I 0 00 M 0
0 0 0
 , A = −
 0 −I 0Lgg Dg Lgl
Llg 0 Lll
 , (2)
where M (resp. Dg) is the diagonal matrix of the gener-
ators’ inertias (resp. damping constants). The dynamic and
algebraic equations of the linear descriptor system (1) are
classically referred to as the linearized swing equation and
the DC power flow equation, respectively. Notice that the
initial condition of system (1) needs to obey the algebraic
constraint Llgδ(0) + Lllθ(0) = Pθ(0), where Pθ(0) is the
vector containing the entries {2n+ 1, . . . , 2n+m} of P (0).
Finally, we assume the parameters of the power network
descriptor model (1) to be known, and we remark that
they can be either directly measured, or estimated through
dynamic identification techniques, e.g., see [11].
Throughout the paper, the assumption is made that a
combination of the state variables of the descriptor system
(1) is being continuously measured over time. Let C ∈ Rp×n
be the output matrix and let y(t) = Cx(t) denote the p-
dimensional measurements vector. Moreover, we allow for
the presence of unknown disturbances affecting the behavior
of the plant (1), which, besides reflecting the genuine failure
of network components, can be the effect of a cyber-physical
attack against the network. We classify these disturbances
into state attacks, if they show up in the measurements
vector after being integrated through the network dynamics,
and output attacks, if they corrupt directly the measurements
vector.1 The network dynamics in the presence of a cyber-
physical attack can be written as
Ex˙(t) = Ax(t) +
[
F 0
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
[
f(t)
`(t)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
u(t)
,
y(t) = Cx(t) +
[
0 L
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
[
f(t)
`(t)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
u(t)
.
(3)
The input signals f(t) and `(t) are referred to as state
and output attack modes, respectively. The attack modes are
assumed to be unknown and piece-wise continuous functions
of time of dimension 2n + m and p, respectively, and they
act through the full rank matrices F ∈ R(2n+m)×(2n+m)
and L ∈ Rp×p. For notational convenience, and without
affecting generality, we assume that each state and output
variable can be independently compromised by an attacker.
Therefore, we let F and L be the identity matrices of
dimensions 2n + m and p. The attack mode u(t) depends
upon the specific attack profile. In the presence of k ∈ N0,
k ≤ 2n + m + p, attackers indexed by the attack set
K ⊆ {1, . . . , 2n+m+p}, the corresponding (vector) attack
mode t 7→ uK(t) ∈ R2n+m+p has exactly k nonzero entries
1Because of the linearity of (1), the known input P (t) can be neglected,
since it does not affect the detectability of unknown input attacks.
uK,i(t) for i ∈ K. Accordingly, the pair (BK , DK) is called
attack signature, where BK and DK are the submatrices of
B and D with columns indexed by K.
The model (3) is very general, and it can capture the
occurrence of several concurrent contingencies in the power
network, which are caused either by components failure or
external attacks.2 For instance,
(i) a change in the mechanical power input to generator i
(resp. in the real power demand of load j) is described
by the attack signature (Bi, 0) (resp. (B2n+j , 0)), and
a non-zero attack mode un+i(t) (resp. u2n+j(t));
(ii) a line outage occurring on the line {r, s} is modeled
by the signature ([Br Bs], [0 0]) and a non-zero mode
[ur(t) us(t)]
T [4]; and
(iii) the failure of sensor i, or the corruption of the i-th
measurement by an attacker is captured by the signa-
ture (0, D2n+m+i) and a non-zero mode u2n+m+i(t).
B. Notions of detectability and identifiability for attack sets
In this section we present the problem under investigation
and we recall some definitions. Observe that a cyber-physical
attack may remain undetected from the measurements if there
exists a normal operating condition of the network under
which the output would be the same as under the perturbation
due to the attacker. Let x(x0, u, t) denote the network state
trajectory generated from the initial state x0 under the attack
signal u(t), and let y(x0, u, t) be the output sequence for
the same initial condition and input. Throughout the paper,
let T ⊆ R≥0 denote the set of time instants at which the
presence of attacks against the network is checked.
Definition 1 (Undetectable attack set): For the linear
descriptor system (3), the attack set K is undetectable if there
exist initial conditions x1, x2 ∈ R2n+m, and an attack mode
uK(t) such that, for all t ∈ T , y(x1, uK , t) = y(x2, 0, t).
A more general concern than detection is identifiability of
attackers, i.e., the possibility to distinguish from measure-
ments between the action of two distinct attacks.
Definition 2 (Unidentifiable attack set): For the linear
descriptor system (3), the attack set K is unidentifiable if
there exists an attack set R, with |R| ≤ |K| and R 6= K,
initial conditions xK , xR ∈ R2n+m, and attack modes uK(t),
uR(t) such that, for all t ∈ T , y(xK , uK , t) = y(xR, uR, t).
Of course, an undetectable attack is also unidentifiable,
since it cannot be distinguished from the zero input. The
converse does not hold. The security problem we consider
in this paper is as follows.
Problem: (Attack detection and identification) For the
linear descriptor system (3), design an attack detection and
identification procedure.
Definitions 1 and 2 are immediately applicable to arbi-
trary constrol systems subjects to external attacks. Before
proposing a solution to the Attack detection and identification
Problem, we motivate the use of a dynamic detection and
identification algorithm by characterizing the fundamental
limitations of static and dynamic procedures.
2Genuine failures are a subcase of intentional cyber-physical attacks.
III. LIMITATIONS OF STATIC AND DYNAMIC PROCEDURES
FOR DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION
The objective of this section is to show that some fun-
damental limitations of a static detection procedure can be
overcome by exploiting the network dynamics. We start by
deriving a reduced state space model for a power network,
which is convenient for illustration and analysis purposes.
A. Kron-reduced representation of a power network
For the system (3), let F = [ FTδ FTω FTθ ]
T, L =
[ LTδ L
T
ω L
T
θ ]
T, and C = [Cδ Cω Cθ ], where the partitioning
reflects the state x = [δT ωT θT]T. Since the network
Laplacian matrix is irreducible (due to connectivity), the
submatrix Lll in (2) is invertible and the bus voltage angles
θ(t) can be expressed via the generator rotor angles δ(t) and
the state attack mode f(t) as
θ(t) = −L−1ll Llgδ(t)− L−1ll Fθf(t). (4)
Hence, the descriptor system (3) is of index one [4]. The
elimination of the algebraic variables θ(t) in the descriptor
system (3) leads to the state space system[
δ˙
ω˙
]
=
[
0 I
−M−1(Lgg − LglL−1ll Llg) −M−1Dg
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A˜
[
δ
ω
]
+
[
Fδ 0
M−1Fω −M−1LglL−1ll Fθ 0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B˜
u , (5)
y(t) =
[
Cδ − CθL−1ll Llg Cω
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
C˜
[
δ
ω
]
+
[−CθL−1ll Fθ L]︸ ︷︷ ︸
D˜
u.
This reduction of the passive bus nodes is known as Kron
reduction in the literature on power networks and circuit
theory [26]. In what follows, we refer to (5) as the Kron-
reduced system. Accordingly, for each attack set K, the
attack signature (BK , DK) is mapped to the corresponding
signature (B˜K , D˜K) in the Kron-reduced system through the
transformation for the matrices B and D described in (5).
Clearly, for any state trajectory of the Kron-reduced (5), the
corresponding state trajectory of the (non-reduced) descriptor
power network model (3) can recovered by identity (4).
We point out the following subtle but important facts,
which are easily visible in the Kron-reduced system (4). First,
a state attack Fθf(t) on the buses affects directly the output
y(t). Second, for a connected bus network, the lower block
of A˜ is a fully populated Laplacian matrix, and L−1ll and
LglL−1ll are both positive matrices [26]. As one consequence,
an attack on a single bus affects the entire network and
not only the locally attacked node or its vicinity. Third and
finally, the mapping from the input signal u(t) and the initial
condition x(0) (subject to the constraint (4) evaluated at
t = 0) to the output signal y(t) of the descriptor system
(3) coincides with the corresponding input and initial state
to output map of the associated Kron-reduced system (5).
Hence, the definition of identifiability (resp. detectability) of
an attack set is analogous for the Kron-reduced system (5),
and we can directly state the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1: (Equivalence of detectability and identi-
fiability under Kron reduction): For the power network
descriptor system (3), the attack set K is identifiable (resp.
detectable) if and only if it is identifiable (resp. detectable)
for the associated Kron-reduced system (5).
Following Lemma 3.1, we study detectability and identifi-
ability of attacks against the power network descriptor model
(3) by analyzing the associated Kron-reduced system (5).
B. Fundamental limitations of a Static Detector
By Static Detector, or, with the terminology of [8], Bad
Data Detector, we denote an algorithm that uses the network
measurements to check for the presence of attacks at some
predefined instants of time, and without exploiting any rela-
tion between measurements taken at different time instants.
By Definition 1, an attack is undetectable by a Static Detector
if and only if, for all time instances t in a countable set T ,
there exists a vector ξ(t) such that y(t) = C˜ξ(t). Without
loss of generality, we set T = N. Loosely speaking, the
Static Detector checks whether, at a particular time instance
t ∈ N, the measured data is consistent with the measurement
equation, for example, the power flow equation at a bus.
Notice that our definition of Static Detector is compatible
with [7], where an attack is detected if and only if the
residual r(t) = y(t)− C˜[δˆ(t)T ωˆ(t)T]T is nonzero for some
t ∈ N, where [δˆ(t)T ωˆ(t)T]T = C˜†y(t). If r(t) 6= 0, then a
malfunction is detected, and it is undetected otherwise.3
Theorem 3.2: (Static detectability of cyber-physical at-
tacks) For the power network descriptor system (3) and an
attack set K, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) the attack set K is undetectable by a Static Detector;
(ii) there exists an attack mode uK(t) such that, for some
δ(t) and ω(t), at every t ∈ N it holds
C˜
[
δ(t)
ω(t)
]
+ D˜uK(t) = 0 , (6)
where C˜ and D˜ are as in (5).
Moreover, there exists an attack set K undetectable by a
Static Detector if and only if there exist x ∈ R2n and g ∈
R|K| such that C˜x+ D˜Kg = 0.
Before presenting a proof of the above theorem, we
highlight that a necessary and sufficient condition for the
equation (6) to be satisfied is that L`(t) ∈ Im(C) at all times
t ∈ N, where `(t) is the output attack mode, i.e., the vector
of the last p components of uK(t). Hence, statement (ii) in
Theorem 3.2 implies that no state attack can be detected by
a static detection procedure, and that an undetectable output
attack exists if and only if Im(DK) ∩ Im(C) 6= {0}.
Proof of Theorem 3.2: As previously discussed, the attack
K is undetectable by a Static Detector if and only if for each
t ∈ N there exists δ(t), ω(t), and uK(t) such that
r(t) = y(t)− C˜C˜†y(t) = (I − C˜C˜†)
(
C˜
[
δ(t)
ω(t)
]
+ D˜uK(t)
)
3Similar conclusion can be drawn for the case of noisy measurements.
vanishes. Consequently, r(t) = (I − C˜C˜†)D˜uK(t), and the
attack set K is undetectable if and only if D˜uK(t) ∈ Im(C˜),
which is equivalent to statement (ii). The last necessary and
sufficient condition in the theorem follows from (ii).
We now focus on the static identification problem. Fol-
lowing Definition 2, the following result can be asserted.
Theorem 3.3: (Static identification of cyber-physical at-
tacks) For the power network descriptor system (3) and an
attack set K, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) the attack set K is unidentifiable by a Static Detector;
(ii) there exists an attack set R, with |R| ≤ |K| and R 6=
K, and attack modes uK(t), uR(t), such that, for some
δ(t) and ω(t), at every t ∈ N, it holds
C˜
[
δ(t)
ω(t)
]
+ D˜ (uK(t) + uR(t)) = 0 ,
where C˜ and D˜ are as in (5).
Moreover, there exists an attack set K unidentifiable by a
Static Detector if and only if there exists an attack set K¯,
|K¯| ≤ 2|K|, which is undetectable by a Static Detector.
Similar to the fundamental limitations of static detectabil-
ity in Theorem 3.2, Theorem 3.3 implies that, for instance,
state attacks cannot be identified and that an undetectable
output attack exists if and only if Im(DK¯) ∩ Im(C) 6= {0}.
Proof of Theorem 3.3: Because of the linearity of the
system (3), the unidentifiability condition in Definition 2
is equivalent to y(xK − xR, uK − uR, t) = 0, for some
initial condition xK , xR, and attack mode uK(t), uR(t).
The equivalence between statements (i) and (ii) follow. The
last statement follows from Theorem 3.2.
C. Fundamental limitations of a Dynamic Detector
In the following we refer to a security system having
access to the continuous time measurements signal y(t),
t ∈ R≥0, as a Dynamic Detector. As opposed to a Static
Detector, a Dynamic Detector checks for the presence of
attacks at every instant of time t ∈ R≥0. By Definition 1,
an attack is undetectable by a Dynamic Detector if and only
if there exists a network initial state ξ(0) ∈ R2n such that
y(t) = C˜eA˜tξ(0) for all time instances t ∈ R≥0. Intuitively, a
Dynamic Detector is harder to mislead than a Static Detector.
Theorem 3.4: (Dynamic detectability of cyber-physical
attacks) For the power network descriptor system (3) and an
attack set K, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) the attack set K is undetectable by a Dynamic Detec-
tor;
(ii) there exists an attack mode uK(t) such that, for some
δ(0) and ω(0), at every t ∈ R≥0, it holds
C˜eA˜t
[
δ(0)
ω(0)
]
+ C˜
∫ t
0
eA˜(t−τ)B˜uK(τ)dτ = −D˜uK(t),
where A˜, B˜, C˜, and D˜ are as in (5).
Moreover, there exists an attack set K undetectable by a
Dynamic Detector if and only if there exist s ∈ C, g ∈ R|K|,
and x ∈ R2n, x 6= 0, such that (sI − A˜)x − B˜Kg = 0 and
C˜x+ D˜Kg = 0.
Before proving Theorem 3.4, some comments are in order.
First, state attacks can be detected in the dynamic case. Sec-
ond, an attacker needs to inject a signal which is consistent
with the network dynamics at every instant of time to mislead
a Dynamic Detector. Hence, as opposed to the static case,
the condition L`(t) ∈ Im(C) needs to be satisfied for every
t ∈ R≥0, and it is only necessary for the undetectability
of an output attack. Indeed, for instance, state attacks can be
detected even though they automatically satisfy the condition
0 = L`(t) ∈ Im(C). Third and finally, according to the last
statement of Theorem 3.4, the existence of invariant zeros
for the Kron-reduced system (A˜, B˜K , C˜, D˜K) is equivalent
to the existence of an undetectable attack mode uK(t).4 As a
consequence, for the absence of undetectable cyber-physical
attacks, a dynamic detector performs better that a static
detector, while requiring, possibly, fewer measurements. A
related example is in Section V.
Proof of Theorem 3.4: By Definition 1 and linearity of
the system (5), the attack mode uK(t) is undetectable by a
Dynamic Detector if and only if there exists [δ(0)T ω(0)T]T
such that y([δ(0)T ω(0)T]T, uK , t) = 0 for all t ∈ R≥0.
Hence, statements (i) and (ii) are equivalent. Following
condition (ii) in Theorem 3.4, an attack uK(t) may remain
undetected to a Dynamic Detector if and only if uK(t) is an
input-zero for some initial condition.
We now focus on the identification problem.
Theorem 3.5: (Dynamic identifiability of cyber-physical
attacks) For the power network descriptor system (3), the
following two statements are equivalent:
(i) the attack set K is unidentifiable by a Dynamic De-
tector;
(ii) there exists an attack set R, with |R| ≤ |K| and R 6=
K if |R| = |K|, and attack modes uK(t), uR(t), such
that, for some δ(0) and ω(0), at every t ∈ R≥0, it
holds
C˜eA˜t
[
δ(0)
ω(0)
]
+ C˜
∫ t
0
eA˜(t−τ)B˜ (uK(τ) + uR(τ)) dτ
= −D˜ (uK(t) + uR(t))
where A˜, B˜, C˜, and D˜ are as in (5).
Moreover, there exists an attack set K unidentifiable by a
Dynamic Detector if and only if there exists an attack set K¯,
|K¯| ≤ 2|K|, which is unidentifiable by a Dynamic Detector.
Proof: Notice that, because of the linearity of the system
(3), the unidentifiability condition in Definition 2 is equiva-
lent to the condition y(xK − xR, uK − uR, t) = 0, for some
initial condition xK , xR, and attack mode uK(t), uR. The
equivalence between statements (i) and (ii) follows.
4For the system (A˜, B˜K , C˜, D˜K), the value s ∈ C is an invariant zero if
there exists x ∈ R2n, with x 6= 0, g ∈ R|K|, such that (sI−A˜)x−B˜Kg =
0 and C˜x + D˜Kg = 0. For a linear dynamical system, the existence of
invariant zeros is equivalent to the existence of zero dynamics [20].
In other words, the existence of an unidentifiable attack
set of cardinality k is equivalent to the existence of invariant
zeros for the system (A˜, B˜K¯ , C˜, D˜K¯), for some attack set
K¯ with |K¯| ≤ 2k. A careful reader may notice that
condition (ii) in Theorem 3.4 is hard to verify because of its
combinatorial complexity: one needs to certify the absence
of invariant zeros for all possible distinct pairs of |K|-
dimensional attack sets. Then, a conservative verification of
condition (ii) requires
(
2n+m+p
2|K|
)
tests. In [6] we partially
address this complexity problem by presenting an intuitive
and easy to check graph-theoretic condition for a given
network topology and generic system parameters.
Remark 1: (Stealth, false-data injection, and replay
attacks) The following prototypical attacks can be modeled
and analyzed through our theoretical framework:
(i) stealth attacks, as defined in [21], correspond to output
attacks satisfying DKuK(t) ∈ Im(C);
(ii) (dynamic) false-data injection attacks, as defined in
[22], are output attacks rendering the unstable modes
(if any) of the system unobservable. These unobserv-
able modes are included in the invariant zeros set; and
(iii) replay attacks, as defined in [23], are state and output
attacks satisfying Im(C) ⊆ Im(DK), BK 6= 0.
The resulting system may have an infinite number of
invariant zeros: if the attacker knows the system model,
then it can cast very powerful undetectable attacks.
In [23], a monitoring signal (unknown to the attacker) is
injected into the system to detect replay attacks. It can be
shown that, if the attacker knows the system model, and if the
attack signal enters additively as in (3), then the attacker can
design undetectable attacks without knowing the monitoring
signal. Therefore, the fundamental limitations presented in
Section III are also valid for active detectors, which are
allowed to inject monitoring signals to reveal attacks. 
IV. DESIGN OF DYNAMIC DETECTION AND
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
A. Detection of attacks
We start by considering the attack detection problem,
whose solvability condition is in Theorem 3.4. We propose
the following residual filter to detect cyber-physical attacks.
Theorem 4.1 (Attack detection filter): Consider the
power network descriptor system (3) and the associated
Kron-reduced system (5). Assume that the attack set is
detectable and that the network initial state x(0) is known.
Consider the detection filter
w˙(t) = (A˜+GC˜)w(t)−Gy(t),
r(t) = C˜w(t)− y(t), (7)
where w(0) = x(0), and G ∈ R2n×p is such that A˜ + GC˜
is a Hurwitz matrix. Then r(t) = 0 at all times t ∈ R≥0 if
and only if u(t) = 0 at all times t ∈ R≥0.
Proof: Consider the error e(t) = w(t) − x(t) between the
states of the filter (7) and the Kron-reduced system (5). The
error dynamics with output r(t) are then
e˙(t) = (A˜+GC˜)e(t)− (B˜ +GD˜)u(t),
r(t) = C˜e(t)− D˜u(t), (8)
where e(0) = 0. Clearly, if the error system (8) has no
invariant zeros, then r(t) = 0 for all t ∈ R≥0 if and only if
u(t) = 0 for all t ∈ R≥0 and the claimed statement is true.
The error system (8) has no invariant zeros if and only if
there exists no triple (s, w¯, g) ∈ C× R2n × Rp satisfying[
sI − (A˜+GC˜) B˜ +GD˜
C˜ −D˜
] [
w¯
g
]
=
[
0
0
]
. (9)
The second equation of (9) yields C˜x = D˜g. Thus, by
substituting C˜x by D˜g in the first equation of (8), the set of
equations (9) can be equivalently written as[
sI − A˜ B˜
C˜ −D˜
] [
w¯
g
]
=
[
0
0
]
.
Finally, note that the solution (s,−w¯, g) to the above set
of equations yields an invariant zero, zero state, and zero
input for the Kron-reduced system (5). By the detectability
assumption, the Kron-reduced system (5) has no zero dy-
namics. We conclude that the error system (8) has no zero
dynamics, and the statement is true.
In summary, the implementation of the residual filter (7)
guarantees the detection of any detectable attack set.
B. Identification of attacks
We now focus on the attack identification problem, whose
solvability condition is in Theorem 3.5. Unlike the detection
case, the identification of the attack set K requires a combi-
natorial procedure, since, a priori, K is one of the
(
2n+m+p
|K|
)
possible attack sets. As key component of our identification
procedure, we propose a residual filter to determine whether
a predefined set coincides with the attack set.
We next introduce in a coordinate-free geometric way the
key elements of this residual filter based on the notion of
condition-invariant subspaces [20]. Let K be a k-dimensional
attack set, and let B˜K , D˜K be as defined right after the
Kron reduced model (5). Let [V TK Q
T
K ]
T ∈ Rp×p be an
orthonormal matrix such that
VK = Basis(Im(D˜K)), and QK = Basis(Im(D˜K)⊥),
and let
BZ = B˜K(VKD˜K)
†, and B¯K = B˜K(I −DKD†K). (10)
Define the subspace S∗ ⊆ R2n to be the smallest(
A˜− B˜K(VKD˜K)†VKC˜ , Ker(QKC˜)
)
-conditioned invariant
subspace containing Im(B¯K), and let JK be an output
injection matrix such that
(A˜− B˜K(VKD˜K)†VKC˜ + JKQKC˜)S∗ ⊆ S∗. (11)
Let PK be an orthonormal projection matrix onto the quo-
tient space R2n \ S∗, and let
AK = PK(A˜− B˜K(VKD˜K)†VKC˜ + JKQKC˜)PTK . (12)
Finally, let HK and the unique MK be such that
Ker(HKQC˜) = S∗ + Ker(QC˜), and
HKQC˜ = MKPK .
(13)
Theorem 4.2 (Attack identification filter): Consider the
power network descriptor system (3) and the associated
Kron-reduced system (5). Assume that the attack set K
is identifiable and that the network initial state is known.
Consider the identification filter
w˙K(t) =(AK +GKMK)wK(t)
+
(
PKBZVK − (PKJK +GKHK)Q
)
y(t),
rK(t) =MKwK(t)−HKQy(t),
(14)
where wK(0) = PKx(0), and GK ∈ R2n×p is such that
AK + GKMK is a Hurwitz matrix. Then rK(t) = 0 at all
times t ∈ R≥0 if and only if K equals the attack set.
Note that the residual rK(t) is identically zero if the attack
set coincides with K, even if the attack input is nonzero.
Proof of Theorem 4.2: Let R be an attack set with |R| ≤
|K| and R 6= K. With the output transformation [z1, z2] =
[VKy,QKy], the Kron-reduced system (5) becomes
x˙(t) = A˜x(t) +
[
B˜K B˜R
] [uK(t)
uR(t)
]
,
z1(t) = VKC˜x(t) + VKD˜KuK(t) + VKD˜RuR(t),
z2(t) = QKC˜x(t) +QKD˜RuR(t).
(15)
Note that the attack set K affects only the output z1(t). The
output equation for z1(t) can be solved for uK(t) as
uK(t) = (VKD˜K)
†(z1(t)− VKC˜x(t))
− (VKD˜K)†VKD˜RuR(t) + uhom(t) ,
where uhom(t) ∈ Ker(VkD˜K) = Ker(D˜K) and uR(t) are
unknown signals, while z1(t) is known. The Kron-reduced
system (15) can equivalently be written with unknown inputs
uK(t) and uR(t), known input z1(t), and output z2(t) as
x˙(t) =(A˜− B˜K(VKD˜K)†VKC˜)x(t)
+
[
BZ B¯K B¯R
]  z1(t)uK(t)
uR(t)
 ,
z2(t) =QKC˜x(t) +QKD˜RuR(t),
(16)
where BZ and B¯K are as in (10), and
B¯R = B˜R − B˜K(VKD˜K)†VKD˜R.
Let S∗ and JK be as in (11), and consider the orthonormal
change of coordinates given by TK = [WTK P
T
K ] ∈ R2n×2n,
where WTK is a basis of S∗, PK is a projection matrix onto
the quotient space R2n \ S∗, and T−1K = TTK . In the new
coordinates [ξ1, ξ2] = [WKx, PKx], system (16) reads as[
ξ˙1
ξ˙2
]
=
[
Aˆ11 Aˆ12
0 Aˆ22
][
ξ1
ξ2
]
+
[
Bˆ11 Bˆ12 Bˆ13
Bˆ21 0 Bˆ23
] z1uK
uR
,
z2(t)=
[
Cˆ1 Cˆ2
][ξ1
ξ2
]
+DˆuR(t).
(17)
The zero pattern in the system and input matrix of (17)
arises due to the invariance properties of S∗, which contains
Im(B¯K). For the system (17) we propose the filter
w˙K(t)=(Aˆ22 +GKMK)wK(t) + Bˆ21z1(t)−GKHKz2(t),
rK(t)=MKwK(t)−HKz2(t), (18)
where GK is chosen such that Aˆ22 +GKMK is a Hurwitz
matrix. Let HK and MK be as in (13), which, in these
coordinates, coincides with HKCˆ1 = 0 and HKCˆ2 = MK .
Define the filter error e(t) = wK(t)−ξ2(t), then the residual
filter (18) written in error coordinates is
e˙(t) =(Aˆ22 +GKMK)wK(t)− Aˆ22ξ2(t)− Bˆ23uR(t)
−GKHK
(
[Cˆ1 Cˆ2]ξ(t) + DˆuR(t)
)
=(Aˆ22 +GKMK)e(t)− (Bˆ23 +GKHKDˆ)uR(t)
rK(t) =MKe(t)−HKDˆuR(t).
It can be shown that (Aˆ22 + GKMK ,−(Bˆ23 +
GKHKDˆ),MK ,−HKDˆ) has no zero dynamics, so that
the residual rK(t) is not affected by K, and every nonzero
signal uR(t) is detectable from rK(t). Consequently, rK(t)
is identically zero if and only if K is the attack set. Finally,
in original coordinates, the filter (18) takes the form (14).
For an attack set K, we refer to the signal rK(t) in the
filter (14) as the residual associated with K. A corollary
result of Theorem 4.2 is that, if only an upper bound on
the cardinality of the attack set is known, then the residual
rK(t) is nonzero if and only if the attack set is contained in
K. We now summarize our identification procedure, which
assumes the knowledge of the network initial condition and
of an upper bound k on the cardinality of the attack set K:
(i) design an identification filter for each possible subset
of {1, . . . , 2n+m+ p} of cardinality k;
(ii) monitor the power network by running each identifi-
cation filter;
(iii) the attack set K coincides with the intersection of the
attack sets Z whose residual rZ(t) is identically zero.
Remark 2: (Detection and identification filters for un-
known initial condition) If the network initial state is not
available, then an arbitrary initial state w(0) ∈ R2n can
be chosen. Consequently, the filters performance becomes
asymptotic, and some attacks may remain undetected or
unidentified. For instance, if the eigenvalues of the detection
filter matrix have been assigned to have real part smaller
than c < 0, with c ∈ R, then, in the absence of attacks,
the residual r(t) exponentially converges to zero with rate
less than c. Hence, only inputs u(t) that vanish faster or
equal than e−ct can remain undetected by the filter (7).
Alternatively, the detection filter can be modified so as to
converge in a predefined finite time [27]. In this case, every
attack signal is detectable after a finite transient. 
Remark 3: (Detection and identification in the presence
of process and measurement noise) The detection and
identification filters here presented are a generalization to
dynamical systems with direct input to output feedthrough
of the devices presented in [24]. Additionally, our design
guarantees the absence of invariant zeros in the residual
system, so that every attack signal affect the corresponding
residual. Finally, if the network dynamics are affected by
noise, then an optimal noise rejection in the residual system
can be obtained by choosing the matrix G in (7) and GK in
(14) as the Kalman gain according to the noise statistics. 
V. A NUMERICAL STUDY
The effectiveness of our theoretic developments is here
demonstrated for the IEEE 14 bus system reported in Fig.
1. Let the IEEE 14 bus power network be modeled as a
descriptor model of the form (3), where the network matrix
A is as in [28]. Following [7], the measurement matrix C
consists of the real power injections at all buses, of the real
power flows of all branches, and of one rotor angle (or one
bus angle). We assume that an attacker can independently
compromise every measurement, except for the one referring
to the rotor angle, and that it does not inject state attacks.
Let k ∈ N be the cardinality of the attack set. From [7] it
is known that, for a Static Detector, an undetectable attack
exists if k ≥ 4. In other words, due to the sparsity pattern of
C, there exists a signal uK(t), with (the same) four nonzero
entries at all times, such that DuK(t) ∈ Im(C) at all times.
By Theorem 3.2 the attack set K remains undetected by a
Static Detector through the attack mode uK(t). On the other
hand, following Theorem 3.4, it can be verified that, for the
same output matrix C, and independent of the value of k,
there exists no undetectable (output) attack set.
VI. CONCLUSION
For a power network modeled via a linear time-invariant
descriptor system, we have analyzed the fundamental limita-
tions of static and dynamic attack detection and identification
procedures. We have rigorously shown that a dynamic detec-
tion and identification method exploits the network dynamics
and outperforms the static counterpart, while requiring, pos-
sibly, fewer measurements. Additionally, we have described a
provably correct attack detection and identification procedure
based on dynamic residuals filters, and we have illustrated its
effectiveness through an example of cyber-physical attacks
against the IEEE 14 bus system.
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